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ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE ROLE
OF DISCRETION
By ROBERT M. COOPERt
THE EXERCISE of discretionary authority by administrative agencies
has probably been subjected to more criticism than any other task of
governmental administration.' And yet from the viewpoint of the ad-
ministrator and the student of public administration, the place of dis-
cretion within the pattern of government is no less important nor dis-
pensable than the more fundamental aspects of political democracy.2
Among those opposed to the use of discretion by administrative officials,
the argument has seldom passed beyond the stage of unpleasant epithets.'
All too frequently the exercise of discretion is loosely characterized by
reference to som such vague symbolism as "tyranny," "despotism," or
"bureaucracy." 4 At its best, such conceptual criticism hardly reaches
above the level of emotional reaction. This blind hostility and suspicion
toward a legitimate administrative function is largely the result of a
misunderstanding as to the basic problems of government which mani-
fests itself in several different ways. In many instances this critical
attitude reveals what appears to be a total misconception of the charaqter
tSpecial Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States.
I. New York Judiciary Constitutional Convention of 1921, Rcr'onT To LrmisLATrn,
Legislative Document No. 37, (1922) 10; BEcx, OUR WOIDNZn.AUD or BunrAucmcr
(1932); Sutherland, Prvate Rights and Government Control, (1917) 85 CE;. L. 3.
168; Burgess, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Order: Against Judicial Review,
55 A. B. A. REPORT 731 (1930); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL Cou.SITz' ON AmSzXNs-ZuATZVE
LAw OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocATioN, 61 A. B. A. REPoar, 720 (1936).
2. See Dimock, The Role of Discretion, in FRONTUMS or Pu uc A xmzsTRAToN
(1936) 45; Laski, The Growth of Administrative Discretion, (1923) 1 J. Pun. Am=.
92; Dickinson, iudicial Control of Oficiol Discretion, (1928) 22 AM. PoE. Scr. REr.
275.
3. The late Professor Freund is a well-recognized exception to this statement.
His studies led him to believe that "the most important point in the development of
administrative law is the reduction of discretion." FREuND, TnE GnowrTH oF A.ac.Z
ADmiismArE LAw (1923) 24. But see the reply of Dean Wigmore in 19 ILL. L.
REV. (1925) 440, and the subsequent answer by Professor Freund in (1925) 19 ILL. L
REV. 663. However a careful reading of Freund's articles on discretion leads one to
believe that he spoke primarily of the administration in a pure police State rather than
a State which must constantly deal with the complexities of the social and economic
order.
4. There is today a disconcerting tendency on the part of those assuming an interest
in the affairs of government to waste their time and efforts by failing to look behind
the symbols which surround most discussions of political problems. The use of such
symbolism as well as the failure to recognize the existence of true facts merely serves
to obscure fundamental questions which should be openly faced. See AmroLD, SkainoLs
oF GOVERNMENT (1935) 199.
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of administrative discretion and the unavoidable necessity for its use in
the execution of governmental policies. In other instances the attitude of
suspicion toward the exercise of discretion is often based upon an un-
yielding belief that any function which is not employed in accordance
with the traditions of judicial technique or at least under its watchful
supervision is inherently dangerous if not completely undesirable.' But
more significant than these apparent manifestations of misunderstanding
is the increasing disposition of those opposed to governmental inter-
ference to use the principle of administrative discretion as a whipping
post for the revival of a laissez faire policy. These more or less con-
fusing ideas concerning the problems of administration have done much
to eliminate intelligent thinking and careful analysis from most discus-
sions of the more fundamental aspects of administrative functions. This
is certainly true with regard to the exercise of administrative discretion.
It will be assumed that governmental administration should and must
be considered in the light of the more recent improvements in both its
methods and operation. To attempt a study of this nature without realiz-
ing that public administration is no longer the completely inefficient and
cumbersome instrument of government so characteristic of the nine-
teenth century is to close one's eyes to the progress which has been made
in the last three decades. However, it is not suggested that administra-
tion is a perfect, unerring machine or that there does not remain sub-
stantial room for improvement in both its technique and accomplishments.
But it seems only proper. that a realistic consideration of the role of
administrative discretion should proceed within the framework of actual
conditions and not by reference to circumstances which no longer find
any basis in reality. Due to the fact that the national government pro-'
vides the greatest variety of administrative problems and that federal
administration most clearly reveals the sharp conflict with judicial tech-
niques, the following discussion will be limited for the most part to a
consideration of administrative discretion in the federal sphere of oper-
ation.
THE GROWTH AND NATURE OF DIsCRETION
Problems of public administration concern the more practical aspects
of a government in operation; their solution demands the adcption of
methods which will insure an equally practical treatment. This practical
approach to administrative problems must first recognize that the nature
5. Compare the refreshingly liberal attitude of Lord Shaw in Local Government
Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 120, 138, where he made the following pertinent observa-
tion regarding the methods of administration: "But that the judiciary should presume
to impose its own methods on administrative or executive officers is a usurpation. And
the assumption that the methods of 'natural justice are ex necessitate those of courts
of justice is wholly unfolnded."
(Vol. 47: 577
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and importance of administration can be understood only through an
intelligent appreciation of the present responsibilities of modem govem.-
ment. No function of administration is more urgently in need of such
a realistic analysis than the exercise of administrative discretion, i.e.,
to that end the role of discretion must be considered against a back-
ground which reveals a constantly increasing demand for more and more
governmental intervention in social and economic areas previously left
to private initiative.7
The relation between legislative action and administrative responsi-
bility has primarily determined the nature and importance of adminis-
trative discretion. Just as the functional aspects of the State have passed
through an extended period of development from the law enforcing
agency of the Middle Ages to the law exerting agency of the present,
so the fundamental characteristics of legislative activity have undergone
an evolutionary growth which has profoundly affected the role of govern-
mental administration. During our early political history, and in fact
almost until the turn of the century, the national legislature was chiefly
concerned with the enactment of laws relating to the more basic neces-
sities of an organized society. In this respect legislative action, or rather
the lack of such action, was symptomatic of the simple police Stafe
which sought merely to guarantee the individual a maximum of freedom
from coercive influences and a protection against the more obvious types
of anti-social conduct. With the creation of a highly integrated industrial
system which brought forth its own new" problems and the subsequent
decline of the laissez faire philosophy of government the national legis-
lature was compelled to concern itself more and more with the social
and economic welfare of the nation. In succeeding stages over a .period
of many years, Congress found it necessary to bring within the federal
sphere of control, by the enactment of regulatory legislation, the activi-
ties of many public utilities, including railroads, telephones, telegraphs,
electric power, motor carriers and maritime shipping, private business
relations and practices, the establishment of national fiscal and monetary
policies, stock market and investment practices, agricultural production
and distribution, labor relations, and a variety of serious problems aris-
ing out of our complex industrial system. But the mere passage of posi-
tive laws bringing these myriad activities under the regulatory power
of the federal government was only the first step in the correction of
social and economic maladjustments. Laws do not administer themselves
-they require an additional force to supervise the execution of the legis-
lative policy. 'The indispensable concomitant of this expansion of govern-
mental control has been an ever-increasing growth in the responsibilities
6. HERRiNG, Pumuc ADmixisTAUroN AND TE PuBUc IN r Esr (1936) 17.
7. Pnmu'm, PuaLic ADrxIsmRATioN (1935) 3-20.
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of public administration. This fact should not be overlooked and can
not be emphasized too often. Once a statute has been enacted into law
it must be enforced by either or both of the other two branches of our
government. The initial application of the law to individual situations
rests with the executive branch, but its ultimate interpretation or appli-
cation in, a particular controversy frequently falls upon the judiciary.
During the period when the national legislature was primarily concerned
with the perpetuation of an individualistic political philosophy, adminis-
tration played but a small part in the execution of the legislative will.
Laws were largely self-operating in the sense that no particular executive
agency was needed to exercise its skill or judgment in the application
of the national policy. Some application of the legislative mandate was
obviously fiecessary, but its enforcement was a relatively simple matter
and generally a semi-automatic procedure. Congressional acts for the
most part were simple in form and related to activities which were easily
susceptible of definition as well as control. But as Congress became more
and more involved in the problems of social and economic readjustment,
the initial administration of its statutes became a serious problem. It
was this development in legislative responsibilities which prompted former
Dean Pound to observe that "as the eighteenth and the forepart of the
nineteenth century relied upon the legislature and the last half of the
nineteenth century relied upon the courts, the twentieth century is no
less clearly'relying upon administration."18  The evolutionary develop-
ment of American government has been away from the enactment of
generic legislation toward the creation of vast administrative powers to
implement the legislative mandate which, of necessity, must be limited
to general terms. This shifting of emphasis from legislation to adminis-
tration is nowhere more clearly exemplified than by the changing character
of our public utility regulation.
There are several practical reasons why Congress has been compelled
to create administrative agencies for the execution and enforcement of
its expressed policies.' And'there are likewise sound reasons why
these agencies have been entrusted with a discretionary authority to
administer the provisions of many legislative acts. In the first place,
Congress could not possibly enact into a single body of law the infinite
details necessary to completely define the national policy involved in the
8. Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards (1919) 44 A. B. A.
REIor 445, 446.
9. "Administrative tribunals . . . did not come because any one wanted them
to come. They came because there seemed to be no other practical way of carrying on
the affairs of government and discharging the duties and obligations which an increasingly
complex social organization made it necessary for the government to perform . . . "




control and solution of many social or economic problems. Consequently,
it was necessary to establish a standard or policy in general statutory
language and entrust its enforcement to an agency created for that pur-
pose. In the second place, Congress possesses neither the scientific kmowl-
edge nor the technical competence to define completely the national policy
in many of its more complicated aspects. The establishment of the
Securities and Exchange Commission was largely due to the inability
of Congress to provide lasting solutions for the intricate problems arising
in connection with the regulation of stock market and investment prac-
tices. In the third place, since Congress remains in session only inter-
mittently, it could not possibly exercise the continuing supervisory power
so frequently necessary to the complete effectuation of legislation policies.
When new fields of regulatory control are entered by legislative action,
careful experimentation is indispensable to the solution of unforeseen
difficulties which are constantly arising in connection with the enforce-
ment of general statutes. The establishment of administrative agencies
has provided an effective instrument to exercise this power of supervision
which is at once informed by training and experience and in constant
contact with the problems of enforcement or administration. The Na-
tional Labor Relations Board was created to exercise this sort of super-
vision in connection with the formulation of a national labor policy.
The same inherent deficiencies which have prevented legislative bodies
from enacting a complete scheme of statutory regulation and from exer-
cising a constant supervision over the enforcement of their general poli-
cies require the delegation of power and authority to perform these neces-
sary functions. The answer to this need was discovered to be the creation
of effective instruments of control endowed with a limited discretion to
administer the. general terms of the legislative mandate. Just as the
legislative body is endowed with a broad discretionary power to select
a variety of policies in the enactment of its laws, so the administrative
tribunal must be similarly entrusted with a discretionary authority to
enforce the statute in such a way as to produce the result sought by the
legislature.'0 By the term "discietion!' is meant the liberty of choosing
between possible alternatives.'" Administrative discretion is the freedom
of choice or judgment with which an executive officer or an administra-
tive agency is entrusted in order to insure the constant and complete
effectuation of the legislative policy in any situation which might arise
in connection with the enforcement of the statute.
To guide and limit the administrative agency in the exercise of its
lawful authority the legislature .establishes a criterion or standard of
10. This distinction was pointed out and approved in Cincinnati, Wilmington, etc.
RRL v. Commissioners, 1 Ohio St. 77, 88 (1852).
11. Dimock, The Role of Discretion, in Foirr ms or PunLic AD~nsTA ir o
(1936) 45, 46.
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action within the terms of the statute itself. This common practice has
resulted in the enactment of what has been described as skeleton legis-
lation, which perhaps reached its most extreme form in the enactment
of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The types of discretionary
authority conferred by Congress upon administrative agencies and the
standards utilized to guide administrative action are as varied as the
classes of activities or transactions that are sought to be brought under
federal control. 2 In light of the factors which have given rise to the
creation and growth of administrative tribunals, a few examples of such
legislative standards which measure the area of administrative discre-
tion should suffice to demonstrate the compelling soundness of these
delegations of authority. The Act to Regulate Commerce authorizes the
Interstate Commerce Commission to consider such complex standards in
the administration of the statute as "reasonable rates," "public conveni-
ence and necessity," "undue preference" and "unreasonable discrimina-
tion." The Federal Communications Commission must consider similar
concepts and in addition such other standards as "action necessary or
desirable in the public interest," "adequate facilities and services," "undue
or unreasonable disadvantage" and "public convenience, interest, or neces-
sity." The Securities and Exchange Commission is required to apply such
concepts as information necessary for "protection of investors," "main-
tenance of a fair and orderly market," "reasonable rates of commission"
and "manipulative or deceptive devices" in the enforcement of its statute.
In the admihistration of the Federal Trade Commission Act that body
is guided by such standards as "unfair methods of competition," "dis-
crimination in prices" and stock acquisitions which "tend to create a
monopoly." In the field of industrial conflicts the National Labor
Relations Board is required to interpret and apply such concepts as
"collective bargaining," "discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of
employment" and "unfair labor practices" which "interfere with, restrain,
or coerce employees" or "dominate or interfere with any labor organiza-
tion." This list of legislative standards could be extended indefinitely,
but these few examples will serve to indicate the complexity of the regula-
tory problems which arise in connection with the enforcement of a specific
national policy.
It would seem to be beyond all reasonable argument that Congress
could, under any circumstances, adequately define such concepts to the
12. Professor Dimoc has suggested that there exist various levels of discretion
which may be classified as routine, emergency, control and social-conflict situations.
He observes concerning the delegation of discretionary authority that it "does not always
assume the same external appearance nor is it equally essential in all realms of admin-
istration. Its raison d'etre varies in degree, depending upon the object of the act and
the nature of the administrative duty :. . But just as discretion is common to all depart-
ments of government, so is it found in all forms of administrative activity." Id., at 50, 51.
[Vol. 47: 577
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extent that the exercise of judgment and discretion by ddministrative
agencies would no longer be desirable or necessary. But the application
as well as the interpretation of these legislative standards to particular
situations in connection with the administration of the respective statutes
requires the exercise of specialized knowledge and technical judgment
seldom possessed by legislative bodies. The administration of general
legislation by technical experts, skilled and trained in specialized fields,
is "the contemporary answer to the challenge to bridge the gap between
popular government and scientific government."13 When these standards
of action are set up in statutory form the legislature seldom takes the
trouble to indicate in express terms that it intends the administrative
agency to have a discretionary authority to administer such concepts.
Yet it is obvious that this is the actual intent of the legislative body.
In many instances these legislative standards have come to have a mean-
ing which inheres in the terms themselves. However, this crystallization
of meaning is usually accomplished only after an extended period of
experimentation and administrative interpretation. 4 In other instances
the content of such standards has a meaning only when related to the
general policy of the particular legislative enactmenL1 But regardless
of the sources which the administrative agency draws upon in its duty
to apply the standards of action in concrete situations, varying degrees
of discretion are necessary to accomplish the purposes sought by the
legislative mandate. The practical result of the creation of these special-
ized tribunals endowed with a discretionary authority is the development
of a competence that expresses "an intuition of experience which out-
runs analysis and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions;
impressions which may lie beneath consciousness without losing, their
worth."' 6
The transmission of governmental policy from its source to the point
where it is finally applied in the form of an enforceable determination
frequently demands the exercise of two correlative administrative func-
tions, both of which arise from the discretionary authority vested in the
administrative agency.1 On the one hand these tribunals are constantly
engaged in the promulgation of general rules and regulations concerning
the various matters within their respective jurisdictions. This function
13. Dickinson, supra note 2, at 277.
14. The standard of reasonable rates is a concept which has come to have a crystal-
lized meaning due largely to judicial interpretation of the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
IS. An obvious example of such a standard is the "public interest' which must of
necessity vary with the legislative purpose.
16. Mr. Justice Holmes in Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. v. Babcock, 204 U. S. 535, 593
(1907). See Fuchs, Concepts and Policies in Anglo-American Admirnistrati 'e Law
Theory, (1938) 47 YALI L J. 538, at 546.
17. See id., at 545.
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has been described as an administrative legislation, since its exercise
involves the implementation of statutes by laying down general rules
for the future action of the agency in question."' On the other hand
these agencies are also compelled to make many decisions applying the
basic law or the rules promulgated thereunder to specific situations in
which a coptroversy has arisen. The settlement of disputes between the'
administiative agency and the party against whom an order is about to
be issued has been described as administrative adjudication, since it re-
sembles, in certain minor respects, the exercise of a judicial power.
Although the line of demarcation between these functions is at times
none too clear, the theoretical distinction suggested is nevertheless worthy
of observation."9 There has been some suggestion that the function of
administrative legislation should be segregated from the adjudicative
processes and vested in a separate tribunal in order to avoid the com-
mingling of such powers.20 But it seems clear that the process of ad-
ministration is one which must be viewed as a whole, and its functions
are not susceptible of segregation in accordance with a few general
characteristics. 2' Despite their distinguishing features these functions
are in a real sense integral and dependent parts of the same administra-
tive process mutually interwoven by the practical necessity of preserving
administrative autonomy. The proposal to segregate these functions
would undoubtedly impair the efficiency and speed of governmental ad-
ministration and tend to disrupt the entire administrative process during
its latter stages. In- so far as constitutional limitations are concerned,
the doctrine of separation of powers has never been interpreted by the
18. See Hart, The Exercise of the Rule-Making Power, in SruDxEs ON ADMINIS-
TRAIVE MANAGEMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE PRESIDENT'S
CoMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT (1937) No. 5.
19. For an exhaustive analysis of the character and nature of administrative func-
tions, see BLACHLY & OATMAN, AD NISTRATIVE LEGISLATION AND ADjUDICATIO
(1934).
20. See the RFPORT OF THE SPECIAL CommrErr oN ADmINISTRATVE LAW OF Tg
AmmcUAN BAR AssociATzoN (1936) 61 A. B. A.- REPoar 720. For a criticism of the
Logan Bill which embodied this proposal see my article on the subject. The Proposed
Administrative Court, (1937) 35 MIcH. L. Rav. 193, 565, 566.
21. In a speech given before the Judicial Section of the American Bar Association,
in Los Angeles on July 16, 1935, John Dickinson, former Assistant Attorney General
of the United States, disapproved a similar proposal for the segregation of the adjudi-
cative functions of administration. In that connection Mr. Dickinson said: "The agency
which makes inspections; collects information, supervises accounts, interprets the statute,
must be the same agency which makes, at least in the first instance, the quasi-judicial
determinations of approval or disapproval of applications for grants and permits, and
the quasi-judicial orders to conform or desist from certain conduct. I do not see how
these quasi-judicial functions can be torn from the executive or administrative agency
without leaving more than a crippled torso behind."
(Vol. 47: 577584
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courts to prohibit this blending of administrative powers.2 2 If we are
to have a competent scientific administrative government, the discretionary
authority entrusted to its instrumentalities must be exercised in accord-
ance with the objectives of the expressed legislative policy free from the
restraining influences of strict constitutionalism.'
.Quite apart from the question of judicial review, which will be con-
sidered subsequently, there are other fundamental safeguards which
limit both the legislature and the agencies of administration in the dele-
gation of discretion. It was previously stated that the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers has never been interpreted to prevent administrative
tribunals from exercising all of their necessary functions regardless of
how closely they may seem to resemble the powers utilized by the other
branches of the government. However, a corollary of this doctrine,
delegata potestas non potest delegari, has received a more restrictive
construction by the courts. This latter doctrine prohibits any of the
three branches of the government from abdicating or transferring to
another branch the essential functions with which they are vested by
the Constitution. And it is this constitutional maxim which has served
as a check on the unwarranted delegation of authority by the legislature
and curtailed the degree of discretion with which administrative agencies
may be endowed. To avoid the restrictions of this doctrine Congress
is compelled to limit the breadth of administrative action by laying
down policies and establishing standards of action in its delegation of
discretionary authority. The purpose of the establishment of these stand-
ards is to canalize the exercise of discretion within the objectives and
purposes of the legislative enactment. Although there is no objection to
the practice of entrusting the instrumentalities of administration with a
discretionary authority to insure the complete effectuation of the legis-
lative policy, thi authority conferred by the legislature must include the
establishment of a criterion to prevent the arbitrary or capricious exercise
22. Brinldey v. Hassig, 83 F. (2d) 351 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) ; Farmers' Livestock
Commission Co. v. United States, 54 F. (2d) 375, 381 (D. C IlL 1931). Recently
the Supreme Court denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in a case 'which directly
raised the question of the constitutional validity of the blended powers in the Federal
Trade Commission. McLean & Son v. Federal Trade Commission, 299 U. S. 590
(1936).
23. "There is an undoubted trend to enlarge the power of the executive branch
by a gradual delegation to it of mixed powers--partly legislative and partly judicial
. . .We found of late years that the sharp distinction of three departments might
be suitable for our country in the early days; but as the conditions and need for their
control became more complicated and novel, ve realized that no one distinct depart-
ment could deal with them alone . . . Instead of adhering to the old distinction, we
bowed to necessity; and when the constitutional right to do this vws challenged we had
the letter of the Constitution yield to the spirit of the demand." Nagel, Federal Detart-
mental Practice, in TnE GaoW"r or AmmcA Anxmmsuavvn LAW (1923) 175,
177-178.
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of such discretion. To state the proposition more succinctly, adminis-
trative agencies may be endowed with a discretion as to the execution
of a law, but they cannot be entrusted with the power to make laws.24
Until quite recently the courts had consistently sustained broad dele-
gations of authority by Congress to executive or administrative officials
in recognition of "the necessity of adapting legislation to complex con-
ditions involving a host of details with which the national legislature can
not deal directly.'125 In most of these cases the degree of discretion vested
in the administrative official was as broad as the situation demanded,
and the courts had little difficulty in finding a standard of action within
the terms of the particular statute.26 However, in two recent cases -
the Ryan and Schechter cases - the Supreme Court took a somewhat
different position and held that the authority which Congress had at-
tempted to delegate to the President did not include the basic standards
necessary to guide him in the exercise of the discretion conferred by the
statutes.27 For this reason the delegations of authority were declared to
be without practical limitation and thus unconstitutional. In view of
these pronouncements it seems clear that although Congress may invest
administrative agencies with a discretionary authority to carry out the
legislative mandate within the limits prescribed by the statute, "the con-
stant recognition of the necessity and validity of such provisions, and the
wide range of administrative authority which has been developed by
means of them, can not be allowed to obscure the limitations of the
authority tQ delegate, if our constitutional system is to be maintained." 2
In order to make the doctrine of non-delegability of powers a more
effective principle and to guarantee protection from the arbitrary or
capricious exercise of discretionary authority the Court has indicated
the necessity of imposing a further safeguard. This requirement, how-
ever, falls upon administration itself rather than upon the legislature
and serves to reinforce the limitations established by the legislative
standard. In the Ryan case the Court not only demanded the establish-
ment of a legislative standard to canalize administrative action, but held
that express findings by *the administrative authority "as to the existence
24. Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692 (1892).
25. Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529-530 (1935).
26. The Brig Aurora, 7 Cranch (U. S. 1813) 382; Field v. Clark, 141 U. S.
649 (1892); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 (1904); Union Bridge Co. v.
United States, 204 U. S. 364 (1907); Monongahela Bridge Co. v. United States,
216 U. S. 177 (1910); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506 (1910); Red "C"
Oil Co. v. North Carolina, 222 U. S. 380 (1911); Avent v. United States, 266 U. S.
127 (1924); Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U. S. 12 (1932); Hampton
& Co. v. United States, 276 U. S. 394 (1928).
27. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935); Schechter Corp. v.
United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935.).
28. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388, 421 (1935).
[Vol. 47: 577
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of the required basis of . . . action would be necessary to sustain that
action, for otherwise the case would still be one of an unfettered dis-
cretion . . .29 Thus, in accordance with the Court's interpretatiori
of the doctrine the legislature must establish a basic standard in its
delegation of authority to an administrative agency, and the agency in
turn must make an express finding to indicate that it is aqting within the
limits set by the legislature 'in the exercise of the authority conferred."
This further limitation on the exercise of discretion is of doubtful utility
as a practical safeguard against the abuses of authority since its require-
ments can usually be met by merely reciting rather vague language con-
cerning the legislative standard." However, in the past many adminis-
trative agencies have made a practice of including such findings in their
decisions, and there is considerable evidence that such a procedure is
of some assistance to courts reviewing the validity of such action. " In
any event, it does not appear that the requirement would hamper or im-
pair the orderly process of administration in its exercise of discretionary
authority.
The preceding discussion was undertaken to present a clear picture of
the nature and importance of administrative discretion. Such an analysis
should demonstrate that there is nothing mysterious or sinister in the
recent tendency to endow administrative agencies with such discretionary
authority. The growth of these administrative powers was logical, neces-
sary, and unavoidable. The legislature found itself incapable of assuming
the responsibilities necessary to insure the complete effectuation of its
policies. The duty of administering the general provisions of these legis-
lative enactments was thus entrusted to selected instrumentalities which
were authorized to fill up the details of the statutes and ascertain the
facts to which the law is directed. To this end administrative agencies
were entrusted with a discretionary authority to translate the general
standard into an effective determination in any situation involving the
application or interpretation of the legislative policy. In this respect and
29. Id., at 431.
30. See The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. 258, 263 (1924); United States
v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 282 U. S. 522, 527 (1931); Florida v. United States,
282 U. S. 194, 215 (1931); United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S. 454,
462 (1935).
31. E.g., an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission vras set aside merely
because that body did not make an express finding, after extensive hearings, that steam
locomotives "equipped with hand reverse gear as compared vith power reverse gear
causes unnecessary peril to life or limb" despite the fact that all the evidence pointed
to such a conclusion. See United States v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 293 U. S.
454, 462 (1935); Feller, Prospectus for the Further Study of Federal Administratire
Law, (1938) 47 Y~A.n L. J. 647, 665.
32. The Federal Equity Rules (70 ) require the District Courts to make similar,
although perhaps more extensive, findings of fact in cases coming before them.
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from a functional. standpoint administrative discretion is the life blood
upon which the entire administrative process feeds; without its vitalizing
contribution the machinery of administration would degenerate into an
impotent force with neither purpose nor direction. In a certain sense
the recent tendency to invest administrative agencies with a discretionary
authority is a belated recognition of the paramountcy of the public over
private interests. To this extent the principles of public law repudiate
the older theory that administrative justice must be meted out in accord-
ance with the traditions of the common law, for in view of the present
responsibilities of the modem State the rights and interests of the private
citizen can no longer be placed above or on an equal basis with the
privileges and interests of government. The sound exercise of discre-
tionary authority is the answer to the demand that administration be
accorded a freedom to determine what the national interest requires in
any situation within its control.
THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION
Discussions concerning the scope of judicial control over administra-
tive determinations comprise the major part of the legal literature in
the administrative law field.3 A comprehensive analysis of the existing
rules of review would fall beyond the narrow limits of this study. How-
ever, it will be necessary to examine, in a general way, some of the
more important judicial decisions which have served to guide the courts
in the performance of their traditional duties as the self-appointed super-
visors of the governmental process.
It must be admitted at the outset that some measure of control over
administrative action is necessary to protect private rights from arbitrary
and unlawful interference. And similarly it must be conceded that certain
aspects of this control have been properly committed to the judiciary.
The more difficult problem arises in connection with a determination as
to how far the courts should be permitted to extend their control in
reviewing the validity of administrative action. The need for a formula
to define adequately the areas of administrative immunity and judicial
supervision is one of the most pressing problems facing government
today. Although there is an unmistakable legislative tendency to recog-
nize the 'basic autonomy of administration, 4 there is still much to be
desired in the way of a satisfactory balance between free administrative
action and the utilization of traditional legal safeguards. In analyzing
the elaborate set of rules relating to the scope of review which the courts
33. See the voluminous material on this subject cited in Black, The "Jurisdictional
Fact" Theory and Administrative Finality, (1937) 22 CORx. L. Q. 349, 515.
34. For a thorough study of the recent tendency to immunize administrative de-
terminations see Dickinson, The Conclusiveness of Administrative Fact-Deterrination"
Since the Ben Avon Case (1935) 16 P. U. FORT. 385.
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have established by piecemeal adjudication, it is important to understand
what the courts do in particular cases as well as what they say. Further-
more, since these rules are largely self-imposed by the judiciary itself,35
it is also necessary to recognize the many exceptions to the general rules
that have been created by reference to nice technical distinctions in order
to enable the court to exercise whatever control it deems necessary in
the particular case.
With the exceptions of earlier decisions relating to the use of tradi-
tional common law remedies,3 the courts have only on rare occasions
delimited their power of review solely because the authority conferred
upon the administrative agency was discretionary in character. The
judiciary has seldom concerned itself with the character of the adminis-
trative function which it seeks to supervise. As a general proposition
the courts have held in nurfierous cases that the determinations of an
administrative agency are final and conclusive unless arbitrary,. capri-
cious, or not based upon substantial evidence.37 In adopting this principle
the Supreme Court has said that the judiciary "will not consider the
expediency or wisdom of the order, or whether, on like testimony, it
would have made a similar ruling.""8 On an earlier occasion that Court
had indicated that the orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission
would be reviewed only for the purpose of determining whether or not
(a) they were repugnant to the Constitution, (b) they were within the
scope of the authority conferred by statute, and (c) the agency had acted
in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner 9 And this same doctrine was
restated in later cases relating to the determinations of various other
administrative agencies. Commencing with these fundamentally sound
principles, the courts have gradually developed a confusing mass of tech-
nical distinctions which have seriously reduced the area of administrative
autonomy and enabled them to extend their power of review almost
without practical limitation.
The most persistent distinction that appears in both the decisions
and the many legal treatises on the subject is the classification of admin-
35. Davison, Administration and Judicial Self-Limitatlion (1936) 4 GEo. WV&snr. L
REv. 291.
36. Decatur v. Paulding, 14 Pet. 497 (U. S. 1840) ; Reeside v. Walker, 11 How.
272 (U. S. 1850); Dunlap v. Black, 128 U. S. 40 (1883); United States v. Blaine,
139 U. S. 306 (1891) ; United States v. Hitchcock, 190 U. S. 316 (1903) ; Greenameyer
v. Coate, 212 U. S. 434 (1909).
37. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Ry., 222 U. S. 541 (1912);
Manufacturers Ry. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457 (1918); Virginia Ry. v. United
States, 272 U. S. 658 (1926); Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106 (1904);
Morgan v. United States, 298 U. S. 463, 477 (1936).
38. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Ry, 222 U. S. 541, 547
(1912).
39. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Ill. Central Ry, 215 U. S. 452 (1910).
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istrative determinations as "questions of fact" and "matters of law."
The analogy of the division of duties between the judge and jury in
civil litigation was "taken over into administrative law and applied to
the division of function between courts and administrative agencies."' 0
In developing this distinction the courts have held that if the adminis-
trative action is based upon a pure question of fact, it will not be set
aside as long as there is substantial evidence to support the finding."
If, on the other hand,* the administrative determination is construed to
be based upon an issue of law, the entire proceeding will be reviewed,
and the court will exercise its own independent judgment as to the validity
of the conclusions reached by the tribunal involved. 42 This classification
of administrative determinations into questions of fact and matters of
law has been subjected to withering criticism,"3 and it is doubtful if the
distinction has served any useful purpose other than to indicate the
complete irrationality of the courts' explanation as to their duty with
respect to the control of administration." To a certain degree the courts
have conceded the inappropriateness of the law-fact classification to many
administrative determinations by recognizing the existence of a third
category which has been designated as "mixed questions of law and
fact.' 4 r But this further classification has only served to introduce a
new complexity since the courts immediately asserted the right to sub-
ject these mixed questions to the same complete judicial review as those
matters which were said to involve pure issues of law.4'
40. MCFARLAND, JuDiciAL CONTROL OF THE FEDERAL TRADz COMMIssION AND INTUR-
STATE ComFRcE ColsasissioN (1933) 25.
41. United States v. Louisville -& Nashville Ry, 235 U. S. 314 (1914); Georgia
Public Service Commission v. United States, 283 U. S. 765, 775 (1931); Swayne
& Hoyt, Ltd. v. United States, 300 U. S. 297 (1937); Acker v. United States, 298
U. S. 426, 434 (1936).
42. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry, et al. v. United States, 295 U. S. 193, 201-202 (1935);
New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S. 184, 203 (1923); United States v. Abilene &
Southern Ry., 265 U. S. 274, 286-290 (1924).
43. "The delusive simplicity of the distinction between questions of law and
questions of fact has been found a will-of-the-wisp by travellers approaching it from
several directions." Isaacs, The Law and the Facts, (1922) 22 CoL. L. REV. 1. See
also DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND SUPREMACY OF THE LAw (1927) 49;
McFARLAND, op. cit. supra note 40, at 25.
44. "Matters of law grow downward into roots of fact, and matters of fact reach
upward, without a break, into matters of law. The knife of policy alone effects an
artificial cleavage at the point where the court chooses to draw the line betwecn public
interest and private rig/t. It would seem that when the courts are unwilling to review,
they ire tempted to explain by the easy device of calling the question one of 'fact'
S. . " Dickinsoi, op. cit. supra note 43, at 55. See also Clark and Stone, Review
of Findings of Fact (1937) 4 UrIv. oF CHL L. R v. 190, for an excellent critique of
the subject as it relates to the lower federal courts.
45. Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, -194 U. S. 106 (1904).
46. United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105 (1936); Interstate Commerce Com-
mission v. Union Pacific Ry., 222 U. S. 541 (1912); St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v.
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Still other judicial distinctions have enabled the courts to develop
inroads on the basic principle that administrative fact determinations
are generally final and conclusive. The doctrine of constitutional or
jurisdictional fact determinations is the basis of another technical classi-
fication with respect to which the reviewing court must exercise its own
independent judgment as to the validity of the administrative ruling.
Regarding such determinations the Supreme Court has said that "the
final determination of the existence of facts upon which the enforcement
of the constitutional rights of the citizen depend" cannot be committed
to an administrative agency.4 T Thus, it would appear that wherever an
administrative ruling is attacked on the ground that it violates the con-
stitutional rights of the party against whom the determination was made,
the reviewing court must reach its own independent judgment as to the
validity of such administrative action."' Similarly, the Court has held
that this broad scope of review applies to all fact determinations which
relate to the jurisdictional authority of the administrative agency,4 since
these determinations are said to be fundamental in the sense that their
existence is a condition precedent to the operation of the statutory
scheme.5 0 Consequently, it has been held that when the administrative
agency makes a finding, regardless of whether it is purely factual or
not; which incidentally involves a determination of its jurisdiction over
a particular subject matter or transaction, that determination must remain
open to the independent judicial review by the trial court. In deference
to this doctrine the Supreme Court has apparently denied to administra-
tive agencies the right to determine the extent of their statutory juris-
diction, although it has accorded that right to judicial tribunals in the
past.5" In that connection the Court has said while "it is true that there
may be a [judicial] jurisdiction to determine the possession of juris-
diction52 . . . the full doctrine of that case cannot be extended to ad-
ministrative officers." O
United States, 298 U. S. 38, 74 (1936). But compare: "Where there is a mixed
question of law and fact, and the court cannot so separate it as to show clearly where
the mistake of law is, the decision of the tribunal to which the law has confided the
matter is conclusive." Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. S. 106, 109 (1904).
47- Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 56 (1932). See Landis, Adminsiralt, e Policies
and the Courts (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 519, at 523 ff.; Fuchs, supra note 16, at 563 ff.
48. Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 289 (1920);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932) ; St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
298 U. S. 38, 44 (1936).
49. United States v. Idaho, 298 U. S. 105 (1936); Piedmont & Northern Ry. v.
Interstate Commerce Commission, 286 U. S. 299 (1932); United States v. Chicago,
North Shore & Milwaukee Ry., 288 U. S. 1 (1933).
50. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22 (1932). See Landis, supra note 47, at 523.
51. Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363 (1911).
52. Citing Ex parte Harding, 219 U. S. 363 (1911).
53. Humbolt Steamship Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 224 U. S. 474,
484 (1912).
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Still another but more drastic principle has been developed by the
courts to supplement the distinctions which lie at the foundation of the
requirement that certain determinations must be left open for independent
judicial scrutiny; If it be assumed that the reviewing court must deter-
mine for itself the existence of constitutional or jurisdictional facts,
upon what record is the independent determination to be made? The
Supreme Court has answered this question by holding that as to these
fundamental matters a complete trial de novo must be available to liti-
gants in order that the Court may "determine such an issue upon its
own record and the facts elicited before it."' In other words, the
judiciary is not satisfied with merely supervising the administrative pro-
ceeding but requires a complete retrial of the issues which it believes to
be fundamental. With respect to these basic determinations, the question
is not whether the administrative official "has acted improperly or arbi-
trarily as shown by the record of his proceedings in the course of admin-
istration in cases contemplated by the statute, but whether he has acted
in a case to which the statute is inapplicable."' ' This conclusion was
reached by the Court despite its previous statements that "correct prac-
tice requires that, in ordinary cases, and where the opportunity is open,
all pertinent evidence shall be submitted in the first instance to the"
administrative agency" and that where a determination is claimed to
54. Crowell v. Benson and St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, both
cited sipra note 48.
55. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 63 (1932). An interesting situation has
arisen in connection with the enforcement of the National Railway Labor Act. Although
the administration of that Act is delegated to both the National Railroad Adjustment
Board and the National Mediation -Board, the Interstate Commerce Commission has
been given a special statutory jurisdiction to determine whether a particular carrier
is a "street, interurban or suburban electric railway" within the exemption proviso
of the Act. Upon the request of the Mediation Board the Commission considered the
status of the .Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company and determined that it was not
an interurban electric railway within the exemption proviso. From this determination
the railroad appealed to the courts, claiming that the court must exercise its own
independent judgment as to the validity of the Commission's conclusion since the issue
involved wat one of jurisdictional fact. Dan B: Shields, et al. v. The Utah Idaho
Central Ry., Equity No. 12924 (Dist. Ct. Dist. Utah, 1936). The Government argued
that this was not a case of jurisdictional fact since Congress had authorized the Com-
mission to make a determination on that single issue rather than the Mediation Board
whose jurisdiction was directly involved. The court overruled the Government and
reached its own independent judgment as to the validity of the administrative determin-
ation. The case has been appealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals. Equity No. 1558
(1937) C. C. A. 10th. It raises the interesting question as to whether the jurisdictional
fact doctrine can be avoided by transferring jurisdictional determinations to separate
administrative agencies.
56. Manufacturers' Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 246 U. S. 457, 489
(1918). See also Mississippi Valley Barge Co. v. United States, 292 U. S. 282, 286
(1934); Town of Inlet v. New York Central R. Co., 7 F. Supp. 781, 784 (N. D.
N. Y. 1934).
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be invalid due to the discovery of new evidence "the appropriate remedy
is to apply for a rehearing . . . or to institute new proceedings.""s By
formulating these technical distinctions between ordinary facts and
"fundamental" or "jurisdictional" facts, the judiciary has succeeded not
only in converting the administrative body into "a mere instrument for
the purpose of taking testimony to be submitted to the courts for their
ultimate action," ' but also in reserving to itself the questionable privilege
of completely ignoring the prior administrative proceedings regardless
of how extensive or complete they may have been. 2
This brief analysis of the existing scope of judicial reviewc" reveals
at least two interesting points that are worthy of critical examination in
their relation to the control of administrative discretion. The first point
to be noted- which apparently lies at the foundation of the many
technical distinctions described above - is the inevitable attitude of the
courts with respect to the superiority of traditional legal techniques and
the suggested "difference in security of judicial over administrative
process.""' This attitude may be succinctly described as the presumption
of judicial infallibility. The second point to be observed is the consistent
development of technical distinctions to enable the courts to exercise a
more and more comprehensive control over administration in utter dis-
regard of the unique character of discretion. In short, by the use of these
artificial distinctions the judiciary has sought to supervise the exercise
of discretionary authority regardless of its competency to handle or solve
the technical problems of. governmental administration. Although the
57. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U. S. 420, 445 (1930).
58. United States v. Louisville & Nashville Ry., 235 U. S. 314, 321 (1914).
59. See the vigorous dissent by Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Bensou, and a
similarly critical concurring opinion in St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,
both cited supra note 48. See also Dickinson, Judicial Reziew of Administrative Deter-
minations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact" (1932) 80 Unrv. or PA. L Rzv. 1055;
Comment (1937) 25 CAL. L REv. 315.
60. The courts have also evolved other distinctions based primarily upon the type
of controversy which they are requested to review. These theories, however, have been
used to'restrict rather than to enlarge the existing scope of review. One of these theories
recognizes the impropriety of permitting private litigants to question the determinations
of administrative officers in situations where the government is extending a privilege
or gratuity to the members of the public. See FRsuND, AminsSTATvi Pow ns Owtn
PERsous AND PnosarTy (1928) c. 15. Another theory recognizes the importance of
the efficient performance of indispensable governmental services and functions with
a minimum of interference from private parties, whose interest in such matters is at
the most indirect. And as a corollary to this theory, the courts also recognize that
where governmental functions are being performed in the exercise of sovereign powers
and involve grave questions of policy or of a political nature, the adjudications of
executive officials should not be disturbed by judicial re-examination at the instance
of private citizens whose interests play but a small part in the formulation of national
policies. See Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 43, at 59, 305 et seq.
61. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 61 (1932).
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first point is somewhat beyond the scope of this discussion, its importance
as the basis for a liberal theory of review justifies at least a cursory
examination of the alleged claims of judicial superiority.
This. attitude of judicial infallibility is the result of two very question-
able assumptions. In the first place, the liberal review theory assumes
that therg are certain definite findings of fact ascertainable in any pro-
ceeding involving the adjudication of private rights which, in reality,
are correct, and that any other findings would be erroneous. For lack
of a more concise description, this may be termed the assumption of the
existence of facts in the absolute.62 The fallacy in this positioi is readily
apparent. When a tribunal is created to perform certain governmental
functions in accordance with established policies and is authorized to
act under stipulated conditions, the absolute existence of facts indicating
the presence of such conditions is immaterial so far as the authority of
that agency is concerned. The validity of administrative action depends
upon the facts as found by the adjudicating agency in a regularly con-
ducted procceding for that purpose.6 3 The absolute existence of these
or other facts in reality should have no bearing on the authority of the
agency or the validity of its determination, provided there were no sub-
stantial irregularities in the administrative proceeding.04 A system of
administrative justice which fails to recognize this truism contains the
seeds of its own destruction. Unless there is accorded a finality to find-
ings of fact at some stage in a proceeding - regardless of their existence
in reality - the process of determination and redetermination will
never cease. In this respect fallibility is inherent in the fact-finding
machinery of any tribunal, -whether administrative or judicial. If it
be conceded, as it must, that finality must be accorded at some point,
the only remaining question concerns the stage of the process of govern-
mental administration at which this conclusiveness should be given. In
terms of the present system of administrative justice, the problem centers
62. For a comprehensive auialysis and criticism of the jurisdictional fact doctrine,
see Gordon, The Relation of Facts to Jurisdiction (1929) 45 L. Q. Rnv. 459.
63. "The doctrine of jurisdictional fact thus opened the door to the unduly broad
review which had been foreclosed by the original doctrine that the exercise of admin-
istrative discretion was protected by judicial immunity. It had the further disadvantage
of leaving always to the courts to determine what facts were jurisdictional . . . The
doctrine of jurisdictional fact is the most unfortunate heritage from the older type of
indirect review to the newer types of direct appellate review." Dickinson, supra note 2,
at 295.
64. Science and logic have totally failed to provide us with tools by which we
may iscertain the. absolute existence of any state of facts. At best we can merely
approximate truth. In the conduct of judicial determination this fallibility is immeasur-
ably increased by the abstract nature of legal proof. As Mr. Justice Brandeis observed
in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 85 (1932), the exercise of a delegated authority
to an administrative agency cannot "depend upon the absolute existence in reality of
any fact" since no such absolute determination can be made by any tribunal.
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around the selection of the most suitable tribunal to entrust with this
jurisdiction of finality. A consideration of this question involves an
analysis of the second assumption implicit in the liberal review theory.
This other assumption supporting the doctrine of judicial infallibility
strikes at the very heart of administrative integrity. The advocates of
the doctrine are presumably of the opinion that an independent tribunal
endowed with the antiquated or cumbersome methods uf legal procodure,
steeped in the traditions of the common law and completely isolated from
the previous steps in the administrative process, is the most suitable
agency to determine finally the existence of certain basic facts pertaining
to an administrative controversy. No adequate reason has ever been
advanced to explain why judges, apart from their individual capacities,
are the "only suitable custodians of administrative honor and decorum"
or "by what strange process . . . judges become more trustworthy
than" administrative officials." It is hardly reasonable to assume that
a judiciary, completely untrained in the problems of public administra-
tion, is more capable or more likely to reach proper results than experi-
enced administrators selected primarily for their specialized knowledge,
technical competence, and thorough familiarity with the intricacies of
modem governmental policies." 6 In recognition of this truth the tendency
of legislative practice has been in the direction of according greater
administrative finality to official action. Within the sphere of legitimate
governmental fuinctions, positive administrative adjudication constantly
tends to replace the wholly negative aspects of judicial control. And it
is noteworthy that a few of the more enlightened members of the judi-
ciary are frank in their recognition of the judicial inability to supervise
effectively the specialized tasks of administration." This incapacity of
the judiciary effectively to supervise or control the processes of admin-
istration is nowhere more apparent than in those instances where the
administrative agency renders a determination in the exercise of its
discretionary authority."' A consideration of this matter brings us to
65. Dimock, Forms of Control Over .qdministrative .4tion, in HAt.ES AND DimocZ,
EssAYs ON THE LAW AN1 PRAcricE OF GOVER.NMENTAL Aint.tiNsT%.rto.N (1035) 287, 297.
66. The realistic discussions of Jerome Frank and Professors Arnold and Robinson
have done much to diipel the aura of superiority which frequentl) surrounds the practice
and procedure of judicial tribunals. See FRANK. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) ;
ARN-OLD, FOLKLORE Or CAPITALISM , 1937) : RoBixsoN. LAW AN:D THE LWVEns (1935).
67. Notably Justices Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo of the Supreme Court of the
United States. Justice Stephens of the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. Judge Hand of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Pound
of the New York Court of Appeals, and Chief Justice Rosenberry of the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin.
68. The development of a sound system of administrative justice "is nvt furthered
by the mere substitution of the opinion of the judges for the opinion of administrative
experts as to issues and matters peculiar to individual cases. Such substitution does not
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the second point which was selected for discussion - the judicial tendency
to ignore the unique character of the functions vested in administrative
agencies and its effect upon the exercise of discretion.
It must be obvious that the technical distinctions developed by the
courts to justify their departures from the basic principle of administra-
tive finality completely disregard the necessity for allowing administra-
tion to perform its discretionary functions withifi the area of legislative
policy free from the restraining hand of the judiciary. Since the exercise
of discretionary authority, involves all types of administrative determina-
tions, the utilization of the fundamental or basic fact classification im-
pinges upon the free exercise of discretion to the extent that the dis-
tinction is adhered to by the reviewing court. Furthermore, since the
law-fact classification is at best a nebulous one, the judicial' tendency
is to exercise an independent judgment as ta any determination which is
not clearly and completely based upon a pure finding of fact.09 The
reality of this tendency, as well as its unfortunate effects, are borne out
by the history of the Supreme Court decisions relating to the review of
the administrative determinations under the Federal Trade Commission
Act."0 Neither space nor time permit a comprehensive examination of
the various instances in which the courts have paralyzed the adminis-
tration of legislative policy by interfering with the legitimate exercise
of discretionary adminisirative authority. However, as long as the courts
are guided in their control over administrative activities by distinctions
of their own making which permit no freedom for the exercise of dis-
cretion, it must be assumed that the administrative agency is not fully.
accomplishing the purposes for which it was established. And this ob-
servation is pertinent even with respect to those matters which the courts
have described as "questions of law." Although the judicial distinction
used to subject administrative determinations involving a statutory con-
struction to an independent judicial supervision "has a plausible ring of
rationality,""' there can be no doubt that such control, when exercised,
frequently results in a perversion of the legislative standard. In many
instances the courts have held that the meaning of a statute, including
the basic policy which was established to guide the administrative agency,
is a question which must be finally determined by the judiciary rather
than the agency established for that purpose.72 Thus the courts have not
subordinate discretion to law; it simply sets the discretion of an unqualified agency In
the place of a qualified one. It piles one discretionary authority on top of another."
Dickinson, supra note 2, at 297, 298.
69. See supra note 43.
70. See Landis, supra note 47, at 534.
71. Pound, Administrative Application of Legal Standards, (1919) 44 A. B. A.
REPoRT 445, 462.
72. The author is not unmindful 6f the fact that the courts must be permitted to
exercise some degree of control over administrative action to avoid arbitrary and
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infrequently succeeded in converting an expression of legislative policy
or standard of administrative action into a hard and fast issue of sub-
stantive law - which is precisely what the legislature sought to avoid by
establishing an administrative agency to exercise a continuing supervision
ii its field of regulatory control. By this process of judicial usurpation
the courts rather than the administrators have become the final arbiters
as to the content and meaning of national legislative standards.73 As a
practical matter the judiciary is no more fitted to enter the specialized
fields of public administration, nor endowed with the technical competence
necessary to solve the intricate problems arising in connection with the
enforcement of modem legislative policies, than are the legislative bodies
which were forced to delegate such functions to specialized tribunals.74
Obviously, then, the courts are in no position to supervise the exercise
of discretionary authority by these specialized tribunals except in those
cases where there is a clear abuse of power or authority. In any event
it is difficult to justify the courts' position in attempting to substitute
their own judgment in matters of discretion or legislative policy for that
of an experienced administrative agency. Similarly, but to an even
greater extent, the practice of permitting a complete trial de novo on
certain fundamental issues which inevitably involve the exercise of dis-
capricious rulings. The question really resolves itself into one of how far the judicial
function should extend. Questions of law, including the construction of statutes, have
traditionally been determined by the judiciary. But it does not follow that the courts
are the only agencies capable of interpreting the content of legislative standards. From
a purely functionil view-point, administration is more suitably equipped to acertain the
true legislative purpose in the establishment of complex policies than are the courts.
Therefore, as in the case of administrative fact determinations, the province of the
judiciary should be limited to the issue of reasonableness. The courts should not be
permitted to search for the correct interpretation of a statute, after an administrative
agency has attempted to make such a determination, but should merely inquire as to the
reasonableness of the particular determination which has been made. This would allow
the administrative authority to perform the functions for which it vas established-a
function which incidentally is wholly legislative. See Landis, Busifess Policy and he
Courts (1937) 27 YAL REv. 235.
73. Due to the technical aspects of modern legislation it has become practically
impossible to segregate pure questions of statutory interpretation from issues of legis-
lative policy. In a large measure this is due to the imperfections of language which
render precise judgments uncertain. Se Professor Laski's Note in the RErnor oP TnE
Commrmrrx oN MixisTRrs' PowErs (His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1932). The
essential reason why the judiciary is unsuited to pass upon questions of policy is because
they tend to give to the concept of private rights a pre-eminence which is incompatible
with modern theories of government. In other words the judicial tendency is to construe
statutes in such a manner as to protect private rights with little or no consideration
of the social or economic policy which lies at the foundation of the law. Jennings,
The Report On Ministers' Powers (1932) 10 J. Pun. ADM.N. 333.
74. See supra p. 580.
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cretion reaches beyond the outermost bounds of sound governmental
practice.
On several occasions the courts have frankly recognized their own
incapacity to deal with the difficult problem of governmental administra-
tion. In one such instance when Congress attempted to vest the judiciary
with a jurisdiction to supervise certain administrative processes, the
Supreme Court refused to permit the Federal courts to assume this task
on the ground that they cannot constitutionally "exercise or participate
in the exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or adminis-
trative."' 75 It was indicated that if the courts were compelled to consider
such administrative questions they would be acting beyond their judicial
functions in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. Yet
these same courts claim the right to substitute their own independent
judgment, on the basis of an entirely new judicial proceeding, with
respect to the validity of administrative determinations which in their
very nature are either "legislative or administrative" but certainly not
judicial. In other and more frequent instances the courts have conceded
the difficulty of their task and expressed the desire to rely upon the
findings of administrative agencies in reaching their "independent" con-
clusions as to the validity of administrative determinations. Thus the
Supreme Court has said that "there is a strong presumption in favor
of the conclusions reached by an experienced administrative body""7 and
that they "will not be disturbed save as in particular instances they are
plainly shown to be overborne."' 77 The burden on a judge reviewing the
legality of administrative action is admittedly a heavy one. But the
mental gymnastics involved in simultaneously recognizing the "strong
presumption in favor of the conclusions reached by an experienced ad-
ministrative agency" and "exercising an independent judgment" as to the
validity of such administrative determinations would appear to be beypnd
the capacity of even the greatest human intellect. And it is precisely for
this reason that it is more important to emphasize what the courts
actually do in reviewing administrative action rather than the abstract
principles to which they have given mere lip-service in various judicial
opinions on the subject.
Before concluding this section on judicial review it seeis appropriate
to indicate a few special problems arising from the peculiar character
of discretion as related to its control by an external force. It has previ-
75. Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U. S. 464, 469 (1930).
See also Keller v. Pbtomac Electric Power Co., 261 U. S. 428 (1923); Postum Cereal
Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U. S. 693 (1927).
76. Danwellfv. Edwards, 244 U. S. 564, 569 (1917).
77. St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U. S. 38, 54 (1936). See also




ously been suggested that the primary purpose of investing the instru-
ments of administration with a discretionary authority was to place the
enforcement of legislative policies in the hands of officials who presum-
ably possess a technical competence and specialized knowledge in their
particular fields of governmental activity. In this respect the exercise
of discretion is synonymous with the operation of a scientific govern-
ment. Consequently, the efficiency of administration in performing its
functions is reduced to the extent that its operations are controlled by
external force which does not possess this indispensable degree of spe-
cialized ability. Whether the. discretionary function is subject to a super-
visory control by the judiciary or by any other non-expert body, the
ultimate result is a perversion of the entire process. of administration.
One of the more obvious effects of this external control is the inevitable
tendency to crystallize the exercise of discretion by the formulation of
general standards or rigid concepts which serve to confine the delegated
authority within certain preconceived channels. While it may well be
true that the gradual evolution of administrative action from discretion
to predictable rule is a desirable situation,7 this development should come
from within administration itself as the result of actual experience rather
than by an arbitrary compulsion from an outside force. Not the least
of the more desirable aspects of the delegation of discretionary authority
is its inherent capacity to accommodate itself to the many unforseen
problems that arise in the enforcement of general legislative policies.
The establishment of external controls to supervise the exercise of dis-
cretion tends to reduce this element of flexibility in direct proportion
to the extent that such compulsion is made effective.
Another effect of the external control of functional discretion concerns
its tendency to "climb" from the rank and file of expert administrators
to higher administrative officials in the face of such arbitrary super-
vision. Under ordinary circumstances the actual exercise of discretionary
autho-ity, at least in the first instance, is placed in the hands of the
non-political expert who possesses the requisite technical competence and
knowledge to administer the more intricate aspects of modem legislation.
The advice and recommendations of these expert administrators are
generally accepted as a matter of course by their superiors, the higher
administrative officials. When, however, the exercise of discretion by
these experts is being subjected to an external supervisory control, there
is a definite hesitancy or reluctance on their part- to exercise the dis-
cretionary elements of the authority which has been intrusted to them.
This places the burden of administering the details of legislative stand-
ards and policies on the shoulders of the higher administrative officials,
who are not selected for their technical competence as much as for their
7& Pound, supra note 71, at 464.
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executive or administrative ability. In addition to the unfortunate
tendency to divorce the administrative specialist from the exercise of
technical functions this condition also violates one of the cardinal prin-
ciples of scientific management, the rule that authority should be coex-
tensive with responsibility. Whether this is due to inertia, fear, or lack
of confidence on the part of administrative experts is somewhat beside
the point. The fact is that for some reason the exercise of discretion
when subjected to an arbitrary control by a non-specialized body tends
to rise to the higher levels of administration where it does not receive
the vitalizing impetus of the administrative specialist which is so neces-
sary to the complete effectuation of legislative policy. Without attempting
to labor the point further it is sufficient to note that there .is abundant
evidence that the presence of external restraints on the exercise of dis-
cretion frequently causes a serious dislocation of the basic functions of
administration and results in a perversion of its legitimate place in the
process of government.
CONCLUSION
One of the most serious impediments to the orderly development of
a sound system of adininistrative justice is the assumption that the
judiciary is the only agency of government which possesses the capacity
to govern. There can be no doubt that the instruments of administration
have been established in response to the growing demands of modern
government which require, above all other things, the competence and
knowledge of expert administrators. It is also abundantly clear that
the courts are ill-equipped and poorly adapted to control the specialized
activities of administration in the articulation of social and economic
policies. In the past such judicial supervision has not only resulted
in a substantial perversion of the legislative will but has also served to
undermine the integrity of. the administrative process. If modern govern-
ment is to assume its proper responsibility in solving the fundamental
and perplexing problems of the day with intelligence and foresight, ad-
ministration must first be accorded a status of autonomy within the
functional structure of the State. Not until an autonomous system of
administration is recognized, free from the restraining hand of judicial
absolutism, can we hope to obtain an assurance of administrative justice
in the first instance. Existing theories of judicial review completely
ignore this problem, since they are primarily concerned with the cor-
rection of "administrative errors" after they have occurred. Further-
more, it should be recognized that judicial supervision over administra-
tive action does not usually concern itself with the quality or propriety
of administrative activity. For the most part, the judiciary merely
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emphasizes what it conceives to be the fundamental safeguards for the
protection of private rights. Pre-occupation with these theories of ju-
dicial superiority tends to shift the emphasis from sound administration,
where it properly belongs, to median administration which merely seeks
to follow the basic principles of natural justice.
The charge is frequently made that administration does not yet possess
the competence, skill or ability to be trusted with these vast powers of
discretionary authority without an active supervision from some outside
source. In other words, there are many who believe that governmental
administrators are just "political hacks" rather than administrative ex-
perts. The short answer to this charge is that for the most part it is
not true. But if we assume that it were true, it would be well to inquire
whether the existence of mediocrity might not have been caused, at least
in part,'by the existing tendency to subordinate administration to a place
of inferiority within the framework of government. Thus the vicious
circle becomes apparent. If the agencies of administration are constantly
subjected to a stringent supervision by tribunals which are assumed to
be superior in status and capacity, it becomes increasingly difficult to
attract men of ability and competence to such positions of questionable
responsibility. But the advocates of judicial supervision rationalize their
demand for this control by charging that the presence of mediocre admin-
istrators prevents a relaxation of this traditional policy of supervision.
The solution of this dilemma would appear to be in the selection of
posisible alternatives to the present confusing state of affairs. To those
who are seriously interested in the integrity of administration and the
improvement of administrative justice, the only acceptable. solution will
be in the direction of making authority coextensive with responsibility
by permitting the development of a reasonable system of administrative
autonomy. To those who distrust the exercise of administrative powers
the only satisfactory solution will be in the direction of placing a greater
and greater burden on the judiciary with either of two results. Either
our judicial system will break down under the tremendous pressure of
these new duties with which it is totally unfamiliar or the responsibilities
of government will be decreased through the lack of instruments to carry
its national policies into complete effectuation.
These observations are not without great political significance.
Democracy is not a self-operating device for good government. On the
contrary, the quality of democracy depends primarily upon the caliber
of men who can be attracted to positions of responsibility and authority
within its political framework. If the concept of an autonomous system
of administration is generally considered to be irreconcilable with th
indispensable safeguards against unlawful administrative action by refer-
ence to the assumption of judicial superiority, popular government will
19381
602 THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 47: 577
inevitably give way to a more efficient form of political authority. Due
to the increasing demand upon government to assume many new respon-
sibilities of the most difficult character, the future of democratic govern-
ment may depend, in a large measure, upon its ability to assimilate a
responsible administrative system into the existing institutional structure
without sacrificing fundamental political ideals.
